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A  good  deal  of  evidence  exists  for  the  positive  impact  of  research  and 
development  (R&D)  investment  on  productivity  growth  and  competi- 
tiveness,  and  numerous  studies  have  a  high  sensitivity  to  this  effect. 
Furthermore,  R&D’s  social  returns  were  found  to  range  from  being  sig- 
nificant  to  very  significant.  Thus,  the  importance  of  R&D  and  its  rate 
of  growth  mandate  that  either  free  markets  or  public  policy  or  both 
determine  and  produce  the  optimal  level  of  spending.  Up  to  1986,  pub- 
lic  policy  to  stimulate  R&D  focused  mainly  on  defense  procurement 
spending  and  the  ongoing  tax  incentives,  such  as  the  research  and 
experimentation  (R&E)  tax  credit.  Since  1986,  however,  the  pressure 
to  reduce  federal  outlays  for  national  defense  has  shifted  the  focus  of 
government  R&D  away  from  defense  and  toward  civilian  technology. 
The  findings  by  Thomas  Karier,  a  Levy  Institute  research  associate,  in 
this  Public  Policy  Brief  indicate  that  the  effect  of  tax  incentives,  and 
specifically  the  R&E  credit,  on  R&D  spending  has  been  ambiguous  and 
that  imports  and  defense  procurements  have  had  a  more  significant 
influence  on  R&D.  These  findings,  in  addition  to  those  of  the  General 
Accounting  Office  indicating  that  the  R&E  credit  has  the  potential  of 
becoming  too  generous  for  large  firms  and  too  restrictive  to  small  firms, 
suggest  that  public  funds  might  better  be  spent  on  projects  that  more 
directly  would  stimulate  private  sector  R&D,  For  example,  savings  from 
defense  downsizing  or  revenue  savings  from  the  R&E  credit,  should  it  be 
allowed  to  expire,  could  be  shifted  to  nondefense  procurement  projects. 
The  task  of  restructuring  and  “modernizing”  the  research  and  experi- 
mentation  tax  credit  has  generated  widespread  public  debate  over  the 
The  Jerome  Levy  Ecmomics  hstirure  of  Burd  CoHqe  9 appropriate  role  of  the  federal  government  in  subsidizing  American  busi- 
ness.  Witnesses  at  a  recent  hearing  conducted  by  the  Oversight 
Subcommittee  of  the  House  Ways  and  Means  Committee  insinuated 
that  in  the  current  environment  of  fiscal  responsibility,  even  programs 
that  apparently  promote  America’s  economic  interest+for  example, 
increased  R&D-are  susceptible  to  the  influence  of  those  determined  to 
balance  the  federal  budget  at  any  cost. 
Even  though  it  is  difficult  to  conduct  a  meaningful  cost  analysis  of  the 
R&E  tax  credit,  the  Genera1  Accounting  Office  recently  declared  that 
in  addition  to  measuring  the  credit’s  direct  costs  (forgone  revenue)  and 
benefits  (increased  R&D  levels)  it  is  important  to  consider  the  social 
impact  and  spillover  effects  of  the  R&E  credit.  Such  effects  have  yet  to 
be  considered  in  a  comprehensive  manner,  which  makes  an  accurate 
assessment  of  the  R&E  credit  difficult. 
In  the  increasingly  competitive  global  economic  environment,  the  firms 
that  will  survive  and  prosper  will  be  those  that  are  able  to  adapt  to 
changing  market  conditions  through  innovation.  Arguably,  such  innova- 
tions  are  often  determined  by  forward-looking  programs  of  research  and 
development;  and  in  this  regard  many  economists,  policymakers,  and  sci- 
entists  concur  and  may  be  alarmed  by  the  fact  that  R&D  spending  in  the 
United  States  has  been  falling  over  the  recent  past.  If  this,  indeed,  is  the 
case,  we  stand  to  lose  ground  in  our  abiliry  to  innovate  and  disseminate 
technology,  which,  in  turn,  could  erode  our  global  competitive  position. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou 
September  1995 
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The  R&D  Gap 
In  1953  private  industry  in  the  United  States  spent  0.6  percent  of  gross 
domestic  product  (GDP)  on  research  and  development  (R&D),  and 
there  was  little  doubt  that  this  level  of  spending  would  be  sufficient  to 
preserve  the  country’s  technological  advantage.  In  1993  private  industry 
spent  considerably  more  on  R&D-l.3  percent  of  GDP-and  yet  there 
was  much  wider  concern  that  this  was  not  a  high  enough  rate  of  spend- 
ing  for  the  United  States  to  compete  successfully  in  international  mars 
kets.  This  concern  was  based  on  comparisons  of  U.S.  R&D  spending 
with  those  of  Germany  and  Japan. 
It  is  reassuring,  if  only  momentarily,  to  note  that  the  United  States  .spends 
more  on  total  R&D  than  Germany,  Japan,  and  France  combined.  Even  as 
a  sham  of  GDP,  the  United  States’s  expenditure  of  2.6  percent  does  not 
compare  adversely  to  Japan’s  3.0  percent,  Germany’s  2.8  percent,  or 
France’s  2.4  percent  (National  Science  Foundation  1993).’  Furthermore, 
there  is  at  least  one  high-technology  industry  in  which  the  United  States 
enjoys  indisputable  superiority:  weapons  manufacturing.  This  distinction 
has  been  achieved  only  after  decades  of  massive  federal  outlays  for 
weapons  systems  and  R&D.  A  comparison  of  defense  R&D  relative  to 
GDP  Figure  1,  shows  that  such  expenditures  by  the  United  States  histori- 
cally  have  far  exceeded  those  of  Japan,  Germany,  and  France.* 
The  U.S.  R&D  deficiency,  however,  does  not  concern  national  defcnsc. 
It  is  generally  understood  that  if  U.S.  firms  are  to  remain  viable  in  today’s 
markets  they  must  have  adequate  investment  in  new  technologies  which, 
in  turn,  depend  on  investment  in  research  and  development.  The  best Cbsing  the R&D  Gap 
Figure  1  Defense  R&D  Spending  as  a  Percentage  of  GDP 
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Source:  National  Science  Foundation  (1993). 
measure  of  R&D  investment  is  nondefense  R&D.  In  1991  Japan  spent 
3.0  percent  of  its  GDP  on  nondefense  R&D  and  the  former  West 
Germany  2.7  percent,  compared  to  a  mere  1.9  percent  in  the  United 
States  (U.S.  Department  of  the  Treasury  1993).  Moreover,  there  is  a  pas- 
sibility  that  even  this  figure  understates  the  R&D  gap  because  it  may 
include  industry  funds  for  defense.3 
Not  only  does  the  United  States  fall  short  of  its  two  major  competitors 
in  R&D  spending  percentages,  but  the  gap  has  been  increasing.  Figure  2 
shows  that  in  1970  the  United  States,  Japan,  and  Germany  all  spent 
approximately  the  same  share  of  GDP  on  nondefense  R&D.  Over  the 
past  two  decades  the  share  changed  relatively  little  in  the  United  States 
but  rose  significantly  in  the  other  two  countries.  The  recent  pattern  also 
shows  that  the  United  States  now  spends  almost  the  same  share  of  GDP 
on  nondefcnse  R&D  as  France,  placing  it  far  below  Japan  and  Germany. 
Direct  comparisons  of  nondefense  R&D  spending  in  the  United  States 
with  those  of  Japan  and  Germany  show  the  same  trend.  An  index  of 
nondefense  R&D  spending  in  the  United  States  relative  to  those  of 
Japan  and  Germany  was  calculated  and  is  reported  in  Figure  3.4  Between 
1970  and  1991,  the  United  States-to-Germany  ratio  fell  26  percent, 
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indicating  that  real  R&D  spending  grew  considerably  more  slowly  in  the 
United  States  than  in  Germany.  The  pattern  was  even  more  profoundly 
realized  in  Japan:  Between  1971  and  1991  the  United  States~to+Japan 
ratio  fell  50  percent  as  Japanese  spending  on  nondefense  R&D  acceler- 
ated  relative  to  that  of  the  United  States. 
These  measurements  were  taken  by  comparing  growth  rates  in  red1  non 
defense  R&D  spending.  If  exchange  rates  were  taken  into  accounr,  the 
picture  would  look  far  worse  for  the  United  States  because  during  this 
period  the  dollar  depreciated  considerably  relative  to  the  yen  and  to  the 
German  mark. 
We  already  may  be  experiencing  one  of  the  effects  of  the  R&D  gap.  The 
United  States  now  imports  significantly  more  high-technology  commodie 
ries  than  it  exports.  As  illustrated  in  Figure  4,  the  U.S.  balance  of  trade  on 
high-technology  exports  has  fallen  steadily  from  a  surplus  of  $16  billion  in 
1981  to  a  deficit  of  $47  billion  in  t992.5  This  dismal  performance  would 
have  been  worse  if  not  for  the  significant  trade  surplus  enjoyed  by  the  air- 
craft  manufacturing  industry,  one  that  clearly  owes  some  of  its  superior 
performance  to  its  financral  ties  with  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD). Cfosing  the l?@D  Cup 
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Source: Authm’s  calculations  based on  data  in  Imematimal  Monetary  FuncI (1994). 
From  1978  to  1985  there  was  reason  to  hope  that  the  U.S.  would  close 
the  R&D  gap  or  at  least  prevent  it  from  widening.  An  upsurge  in  real 
spending  pushed  private  industry  R&D  from  1.0  percent  of  GDP  in  1978 
to  1.4  percent  in  1985.  The  cause  of  the  boom,  to  be  discussed  later, 
appears  to  have  run  its  course.  Private  industry  expenditures  leveled  off 
afier  1985  and  slipped  back  to  1.3  percent  of  GDP  by  1993.  The  current 
level  and  composition  of  R&D  expenditures  in  the  United  States  do  not 
instill  great  confidence  in  the  future  ability  of  U.S.  businesses  to  com- 
pete  succes.&lly  in  world  markets. 
While  there  may  be  considerable  debate  over  the  particular  form  of  a 
national  R&D  policy,  there  is  remarkably  broad  agreement  that  such  a 
policy  is  needed  (Cohen  and  No11  1992,  Hilper  1991),  It  is  widely  recog- 
nized  that  R&D  spending  is  discouraged  by  the  fact  that  information  and 
know-how  can  slip  easily  into  the  hands  of  rivals.  In  economic  terms, 
new  products,  techniques,  and  discoveries  may  have  a  low  level  of 
“appropriability.”  A  patent  system  provides  some  protection  but  is  gener- 
ally  agreed  to  be  inadequate  for  protecting  ownership  rights  to  new  dis- 
coveries,  especially  for  fundamental  discoveries  with  wide-ranging  appli- 
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cations  (Baily  and  Chakrabarti  1988,  38-39).  A  private  firm  likely  will 
underinvest  in  any  activity  from  which  it  cannot  capture  the  entire  ben- 
efit.  This  fact  makes  R&D  a  classic  example  of  market  failure  and,  there- 
fore,  one  that  demands  some  form  of  government  intervention. 
The  importance  of  government-financed  R&D  in  stimulating  innovation 
in  private  industry  has  been  documented  carefully  by  economists.  Perhaps 
one  of  the  most  comprehensive  studies  was  conducted  by  Nadiri  and 
Mamuneus  (1991),  who  found  that  higher  levels  of  government  R&D 
spending  were  associated  with  significantly  iower  manufacturing  costs  and 
higher  productivity.  Some  of  the  strongest  responses  were  recorded  in 
durable  manufacturing:  machinery,  electrical  equipment,  transportation 
equipment,  and  scientific  instruments.  The  rates  of  return  on  public  R&D 
reported  in  this  study  were  substantial,  ranging  from  6.4  to  9.6  percent. 
Earlier  work  by  Grilichcs  (1986)  found  that  the  return  to  R&D  was 
extremely  high,  ranging  from  33  to  62  percent.  He  also  distinguished 
between  the  returns  to  private  and  public  R&D.  The  return  to  public 
R&D  was  found  to  be  lower  than  the  return  to  private  R&D,  a  fact  that 
Griliches  attributed  to  the  relationship  between  government  R&D  and 
procurement.  It  seems  that  large  expenditures  of  federal  dollars  for  mili- tary  research  are  more  likely  to  be  followed  by  the  production  of  a  new 
line  of  weapons  than  an  increase  in  productivity.  For  this  reason,  the 
return  to  public  R&D  was  lower  but  not  insignificant.  The  conclusion 
was  that  R&D,  private  and  public,  contributed  to  higher  productivity  for 
individual  firms. 
Additional  results  indicated  that  the  effectiveness  of  R&D  did  not 
change  much  between  1967  and  1977.  There  had  been  some  speculation 
among  some  economists  that  R&D  was  experiencing  diminishing 
returns,  but  there  was  no  evidence  of  it  in  this  study.  Another  important 
result  in  this  study  showed  that  the  returns  to  basic  research  were  even 
greater  than  on  applied  research. 
A  more  recent  article  by  Griliches  (1994)  highlights  several  of  the  pro- 
found  data  problems  associated  with  testing  the  relationship  between 
productivity  and  R&D  spending.  It  seems  that  a  single  industry,  comput- 
ers,  plays  a  critical  role  in  many  of  these  studies  because  it  has  both  high 
productivity  growth  and  high  R&D  per  dollar  of  sales.  As  Griliches 
demonstrates,  this  single  observation  can  sway  the  results  of  statistical 
analysis.  However,  rather  than  concluding  that  the  computer  industry  is 
a  “bad”  observation,  just  the  opposite  may  be  true.  The  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis  has  invested  more  effort  in  developing  an  accurate 
measure  of  real  computer  output  than  it  has  in  developing  accurate 
indices  for  other  industries.  Consequently,  it  may  be  the  data  for  other 
industries,  not  computers,  that  should  be  questioned. 
Another  concern  about  the  effectiveness  of  R&D  spending  was  motivat- 
ed  by  the  declining  rate  of  patents  per  dollar  of  R&D  between  1920  and 
1992.  Gnce  again  the  specter  of  diminishing  returns  was  raised.  But 
there  is  a  good  possibility  that  the  value  and  significance  of  the  average 
patent  has  been  increasing  over  time.  As  Grihches  (1994)  points  out, 
the  ratio  of  patents  to  R&D  fell  equally  fast  in  the  1950s  as  in  the  1970s 
when  there  was  no  apparent  lack  of  technological  innovation  or  produc- 
tivity  gains.  If  anything,  this  statistic  simply  may  indicate  that  the  num- 
ber  of  small,  insignificant  patents  are  being  weeded  out  by  the  rising 
expense  of  filing  and  enforcing  a  patent. 
While  there  is  an  abundance  of  studies  demonstrating  the  positive  effect 
of  R&D  on  productivity,  this  is  probably  not  the  most  important  func- 
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tion  of  R&D.  Innovations  will  enhance  productivity  when  they  result  in 
new  and  better  ways  to  produce  existing  products;  but  most  R&D  today 
is  dedicated  to  producing  new  and  better  products,  a  fact  that  may  have 
no  effect  on  productivity.  Where  the  results  of  R&D  are  more  likely  to 
be  seen  is  in  changing  market  shares,  raising  exports,  and  enhancing 
sales  and  profits.  Numerous  studies,  for  example,  have  documented  the 
fact  that  high  levels  of  R&D  are  frequently  associated  with  high  rates  of 
profit  (Salinger  1982;  Griliches  1986;  and  Hirsch  and  Connolly  1987). 
It  appears  that  firms  invest  in  R&D  as  one  of  several  strategies  to  com- 
pete  with  rivals. 
A  recent  work  on  this  theme  by  Scherer  (1992)  documents  the  reaction 
of  several  American  industries  to  challenges  from  foreign  producers.  In 
some  cases  U.S.  companies  were  submissive,  scaling  back  their  own  R&D 
programs;  and  in  other  cases  they  fought  back  with  more  intense  spend- 
ing  on  R&D.  From  this  study  Scherer  concluded  that  domestic  firms  are 
more  likely  to  gain  an  advantage  in  their  industries  when  they  ?ncrease 
their  own  R&.D  in  response  to  intensified  innovation  efforts  by  foreign 
rivals-that  is,  when  they  react  aggressively  .  .  .  ”  (Scherer  1992,  133). 
Furthermore,  he  observed  that  firms  were  more  likely  to  respond  submis- 
sively  when  they  were  headed  by  an  executive  with  an  MBA  rather  than 
a  degree  in  science  or  engineering.  All  of  this  highlights  the  important 
role  of  R&D  in  the  competition  for  control  of  international  markets. 
With  this  picture  in  mind,  it  is  clearly  time  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness 
of  our  national  R&D  policy.  Two  of  the  questions  addressed  in  this 
report  are  whether  a  new  R&D  policy  will  contribute  to  closing  the  gap 
as  it  now  exists,  and  what  changes  have  to  be  made  to  our  current  R&D 
policy  to  make  it  more  effective. 
R&D  Policy  and  Tax  Incentives 
The  evolution  of  R&D  policy  in  the  United  States  has  been  motivated 
primarily  by  issues  of  national  defense,  not  international  trade. 
Consequently,  a  major  focus  of  R&D  spending  in  this  country  has  been 
on  the  development  of  sophisticated  military  equipment  and  weapons. 
In  1992  federal  funds  for  defense  R&D  accounted  for  29  percent  of  all 
R&D  expenditures  in  this  country  (National  Science  Foundation  1993, 
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115).  More  than  one  out  of  every  four  research  dollars  was  spent  on 
defense.  While  this  figure  may  appear  relatively  high,  it  was  once  even 
higher.  In  1960,  during  th  e  middle  of  the  cold  war,  one  out  of  every  two 
research  dollars  was  spent  on  defense  (U.S.  Department  of  the  Treasury 
1993;  598,595). 
Other  than  defense,  which  accounted  for  59  percent  of  the  federal  gave 
emment’s  R&D  budget  in  1992,  several  areas  received  smaller  amounts  of 
public  support:  spending  for  health  totaled  $10.1  billion  (14.7  percent  of 
federal  R&D);  space  $6.8  billion  (9.9  percent);  energy  $3.1  billion  (4.5 
percent);  and  general  science  $2.7  billion  (3.9  percent).  The  remaining 
$5.8  billion  (8.4  percent)  of  the  budget  was  spread  over  11  areas,  includ- 
ing  natural  resources  and  the  environment,  transportation,  agriculture, 
and  education  (National  Science  Foundation  1993,363). 
Direct  federal  expenditures  constitute  only  the  most  visible  part  of  the 
national  R&D  policy.  Less  obvious  is  the  fact  that  government  procure- 
ment  can  stimulate  iruhm-y  R&D.  This  occurs  when  firms  compete  for 
valuable  government  contracts  by  spending  their  own  funds  on  research 
and  development.  In  some  cases,  firms  may  be  reimbursed  for  the  expense, 
often  defined  as  lndependenr  Research  and  Development  and  Bids  and 
Pmposuis.  In  other  cases,  firms  simply  may  hope  to  recover  the  costs  in  the 
profits  of  future  government  contracts.  As  Frank  Lichtenberg  (1988)  con- 
cluded  in  a  detailed  study  of  this  issue,  “Government  procurement  as  a 
whole  has  a  positive  and  substantial  effect  on  private  R&D  investment.” 
In  addition  to  direct  expenditures  on  R&D  and  procurement,  the  federal 
government  has  attempted  to  stimulate  private  sector  expenditures 
through  selective  tax  incentives.  One  of  these  is  the  full  deduction  per- 
mitted  for  research  and  experimentation  (R&E)  expenditures  that  dates 
back  to  the  1954  tax  code.  An  alternative  to  full  deduction  would  be  to 
treat  R&E  like  any  other  long-term  investment  and  spread  the  cost  out 
for  tax  purposes  over  the  estimated  lifetime  of  R&E  capital,  an  admit- 
tedly  intangible  asset.  By  allowing  full  deduction,  a  company  with  cur- 
rent  tax  liability  benefits  by  not  having  to  postpone  (and  discount)  the 
deduction  (Leydon  and  Link  1992,15). 
The  primary  focus  of  this  report,  however,  is  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
R&E  tax  credit  as  included  in  the  Economic  Recovery  Act  of  1981.  The 
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possibility  of  increasing  or  expanding  the  credit  is  one  possible  way  of 
addressing  the  increasing  R&D  gap.  Before  considering  this  possibility,  how- 
ever,  it  is  nectary  to  review  the  actual  credit  and  evaluate  its  effectiveness. 
The  R&E  Tax  Credit 
The  R&E  tax  credit  originally  allowed  firms  a  25  percent  credit  on  quali- 
fied  increases  above  a  calculated  base.  (The  rate  declined  to  20  percent 
for  post-1986  expenditures.)  By  confining  the  credit  to  spending  increases, 
the  new  law  limited  the  impact  on  tax  revenue  but  also  raised  the  diffi- 
cult  question  of  how  to  measure  a  spending  increase.  The  simplest 
approach,  comparing  this  year’s  expenditures  to  last  year’s,  was  rejected 
because  it  could  encourage  perverse  strategies.  For  instance,  consider  a 
firm  that  expects  to  spend  exactly  the  same  amount  on  R&E  every  year.  If 
it  persists  in  this  policy,  such  a  firm  will  receive  nothing  under  this  simple 
tax  credit  because  its  tieuse  in  spending  is  zero  every  year.  If,  however, 
the  firm  spends  twice  as  much  one  year  and  nothing  the  next,  it  averages 
the  same  expenditure  per  year  but  qualifies  for  a  much  higher  credit. 
The  new  law  addressed  this  issue  by  calculating  the  base  as  an  average  of 
R&E  expenditures  over  the  previous  three  years,  with  special  provisions 
made  for  the  first  two  years.  ’  While  this  approach  tended  to  limit  the 
rewards  for  a  one-time  jump  in  R&E  spending,  it  created  other  problems 
that  economists  were  quick  to  point  out.  An  additional  $1.20  spent 
today  would  be  rewarded  by  a  30  cent  credit  this  year  ($1.20  multiplied 
by  .25),  but  it  also  would  cause  the  credit  to  be  reduced  by  10  cents  each 
year  for  the  next  three  years  as  a  result  of  increasing  the  base.  The  credit 
is  saved  horn  being  a  complete  wash  by  the  fact  that  firms  prefer  to  have 
money  today  rather  than  tomorrow.  The  lower  the  discount  rate,  how- 
ever,  the  lower  the  effective  credit.  In  the  extreme  case  of  a  discount  rate 
equal  to  zero,  the  effective  credit  is  zero  as  well.  Figure  5  illustrates  the 
effective  credit  for  various  discount  rates  calculated  at  the  pre-1986 
statutory  credit  rate  of  25  percent  and  the  post-1986  rate  of  20  percent.7 
This  built-in  disincentive  was  quite  clear  to  economists;  whether  it  was 
as  clear  to  businesses  is  another  matter. 
The  credit  had  several  other  features.  One  feature  required  that  the  base 
be  at  least  50  percent  of  current  R&E  expenditures,  which  reduced  the 
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credit  for  firms  with  especially  fast-growing  research  budgets.  For  firms 
with  current  expenditures  equal  to  at  least  twice  the  base,  each  addition- 
al  dollar  of  R&E  expenditures  automarically  raised  the  base  by  50  cents, 
thus  reducing  the  value  of  the  credit.  This  feature  of  the  law  was  made 
even  more  restrictive  in  the  1989  reform. 
For  firms  lacking  both  taxable  income  and  the  ability  to  take  advantage 
of  the  three-year  carry-back  provision,  the  value  of  the  credit  is  further 
diminished.  While  the  credit  can  be  carried  forward  up  to  15  years,  the 
act  of  delaying  the  benefit  erodes  its  value  because  of  discounting  and 
uncertainty.  The  credit  also  offers  very  little  incentive  for  firms  that  are 
otherwise  planning  to  reduce  R&E  expenditures.  Before  they  can  begin 
to  take  advantage  of  the  credit,  they  must  first  increase  spending  up  to 
the  base  level.  Altogether,  the  net  effect  of  each  of  these  qualifications  is 
to  reduce  fi_u-ther  the  effective  credit. 
The  original  credit  was  extended  and  modified  by  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of 
1986.  The  most  important  change  to  the  law  was  to  reduce  the  statutory 
credit  rate  from  25  percent  to  20  percent  and  narrow  the  definition  of 
qualified  research.  On  the  other  hand,  qualified  expenses  for  basic 
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research  paid  to  colleges  and  other  tax  exempt  organizations  received  a 
20  percent  tax  credit  (Internal  Revenue  Service  1986,  100;  Senate 
Committee  on  Finance  I989,39). 
Having  been  extended  several  times,  the  tax  credit  was  significantly 
revised  in  1989.  In  order  to  provide  a  stronger  incentive,  the  base  calcu- 
lation  was  changed  from  a  three-year  moving  average  to  a  base  employ. 
ing  a  fixed  ratio  of  R&E  expenditure  to  total  receipts-essentially,  the 
firm’s  average  during  the  period  1984  to  1988.8  The  new  base  calculation 
eliminated  the  penalty  that,  economists  had  pointed  out,  diminished  the 
incentive  for  a  firm  to  increase  R&D.  Businesses  could  now  increase 
their  R&D  expenses  without  fear  that  future  credits  would  be  reduced. 
As  long  as  firms  maintained  a  ratio  of  R&D  to  sales  above  their  1984  to 
1988  average,  they  would  likely  qualiG  for  the  credit.  Depending  on  the 
discount  rate,  this  change  has  had  the  effect  of  greatly  increasing  the 
pecuniary  incentive  for  R&D  spending.9 
The  1986  law  also  phased  in  a  progressively  higher  base  limitation  that 
reduced  the  reward  to  exceptional  growth  in  R&E.  In  the  original  law, 
only  50  cents  of  ach  dollar  spent  on  R&E  qualified  for  the  credit  once 
total  expenditures  exceeded  200  percent  of  the  base.  By  1995,  only  25 
cents  of  each  additional  dollar  qualified  for  the  credit  once  expenditures 
exceeded  125  percent  of  base.”  It  is  this  form  of  the  law  that  was 
renewed  by  the  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1993  and  extended  to  June 
30,  1995  (Joint  Committee  on  Taxation  1993).  The  new  law  greatly 
increased  the  R&D  incentive  by  eliminating  the  rolling  base  but  at  the 
same  time  reduced  the  relative  incentive  for  very  large  increases  in  R&D. 
U.S.  Industry  R&D 
At  least  since  1953,  R&D  expenditures  by  private  industry  have  risen 
faster  than  both  the  underlying  inflation  rate  and  GDF!  As  a  result,  real 
industry  R&D  (R&D  adjusted  for  inflation)  and  industry  R&D  shares  of 
GDP  have  increased  (see  figures  6  and  7).  In  1953  industry  R&D  was 
only  0.6  percent  of  GDP  compared  to  1.4  percent  in  1985.  Figure  6, 
however,  reveals  more  than  a  simple  upward  trend:  after  remaining  rela- 
tively  constant  during  the  197Os,  R&D  shares  rose  quite  rapidly  between 
1978  and  1985.  During  this  brief  period,  R&D  boomed  in  the  United 
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States,  coinciding  with  a  similar  expansion  in  Japan  and  Germany.  But 
spending  by  U.S.  industry  peaked  in  198s  and  thereafter  drified  down- 
ward,  although  still  remaining  above  the  1970s  levels. 
Possible  Causes  of  the  R&D  Boom 
Any  national  R&D  policy  should  be  based  on  a  solid  understanding  of 
what  determines  industry  R&D,  namely,  one  that  can  account  for  the 
1978  to  1985  expansion.  There  are,  as  is  often  the  case  in  economics,  a 
number  of  competing  explanations.  The  first  is  the  already-mentioned 
investment  tax  credit  which  took  effect  in  June  1981.  Second,  one  could 
claim  that  the  end  of  the  boom  in  1986  was  related  to  that  year’s  tax 
reform,  which  reduced  the  size  of  the  R&E  credit  and  tightened  the  cri- 
teria  for  qualified  research. 
There  are,  however,  grounds  for  skepticism  about  these  explanations.  It 
appears  fi-om  Figure  6  that  the  beginning  of  the  R&D  expansion  can  be 
placed  at  1978  or  1979,  at  least  two  years  before  the  tax  credit  was 
passed.  The  credit  evidently  was  not  the  only  factor  in  the  R&D 
increase.  It  also  would  be  surprising  if  the  relatively  small  changes  made 
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to  the  law  in  1986  could  alter  abruptly  the  pattern  of  R&D  spending. 
The  credit  was  only  reduced  f+om  25  to  20  percent  and  was  extended  to 
cover  funding  for  university  basic  research. 
Xming  is  one  problem  with  the  credit  explanation,  magnitude  is  the 
other.  The  R&D  expansion  in  the  early  1980s  is  simply  much  bigger 
than  could  have  been  expected  from  the  credit  alone.  For  example,  sup- 
pose  we  attributed  the  entire  increase  in  industry  R&D  shares  from  1980 
to  1985  to  the  tax  credit.  Could  the  credit  have  caused  a  25,8  percent 
increase  in  annual  R&D  spending.  7”  The  problem  with  this  figure  is  that 
it  is  about  twice  the  size  of  even  the  most  optimistic  estimate  of  the  cred- 
it’s  impact.  In  summary,  the  credit  appeared  to  be  too  late,  persisted  too 
long,  and  was  too  small  to  account  for  the  R&D  boom  of  the  early 
1980s.  This  is  not  the  same  as  saying  that  the  credit  had  no  effect  but 
only  that  other  factors  are  clearly  important. 
An  alternative  explanation  is  foreign  competition.  Firms  can  respond  to 
foreign  competition  in  a  number  of  different  ways:  they  simply  can  con- 
cede  market  share,  they  can  cut  prices,  or  they  can  increase  expenditures 
on  advertising  and  R&D  in  an  effort  to  attract  customers.  An  increase  in 
foreign  competition  in  many  areas  of  the  U.S.  economy  could  be  one  of 
the  factors  behind  the  R&D  boom.  One  indicator  of  the  intensity  of  for- 
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eign  competition  is  the  level  of  U.S.  nonpetroleum  imports.  Figure  8 
shows  the  relationship  between  nonpetroleum  import  intensity  and 
industry  R&D  shares.  Import  intensity  rose  quite  rapidly  during  two  peris 
ods:  1975  to  1980  and  1982  to  1988.  Except  for  a  brief  lapse  related  to 
the  twin  recessions  of  1980  and  1982,  the  rapid  influx  of  imports  from 
1975  to  1988  parallels  the  R&D  boom  from  1978  to  1985.  There  is  a 
possibility  that  at  least  part  of  the  R&D  boom  was  related  to  increased 
foreign  competition. 
Another  possible  explanation  is  related  to  militaq  procurement.  The 
DOD  typically  will  solicit  proposals  from  private  businesses  for  the 
design  of  new  weapons  systems.  These  “design  competitions”  require 
extensive  preparation  and  R&D  on  the  part  of  participants  who  are  will- 
ing  to  incur  such  expenses  in  the  hope  of  being  selected  as  the  primary 
contractor.  Although  firms  may  later  be  reimbursed  for  these  expendi- 
tures,  they  still  typically  report  them  as  industry  R&D,  which  means  that 
the  expenditures  are  included  in  the  figures  relating  to  the  R&D  boom. 
There  was,  in  fact,  a  similar  expansion  in  military  purchases  during  this 
period.  As  illustmted  in  Figure  9,  DOD  procurement  rose  from  approxie 
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mately  1.0  percent  of  GDP  in  1977  to  1.8  percent  in  1986.  The  slide  in 
procurement  after  1986  corresponds  closely  with  a  similar  pattern  in 
industry  R&D.  There  also  is  the  fact  that  the  military  expansion  in  the 
1980s  included  many  high-technology  weapons  systems  such  as  AWACs, 
the  stealth  bomber,  and  the  star  wars  program.” 
Another  event  that  could  have  affected  R&D  spending  in  some  indus- 
tries  was  the  energy  crisis.  Rising  energy  prices  in  the  1970s  eventually 
motivated  many  firms  to  improve  their  energy  efficiency,  which  required 
the  development  and  installation  of  new  equipment  and  production 
methods.  Figure  10  shows  the  historic  pattern  in  energy  prices  relative  to 
industry  R&D  shares.  I3  There  is  little  indication  that  industry  R&D 
responded  to  the  initial  energy  crisis  in  1974,  but  t-he  R&D  boom  does 
correspond  with  the  second  upswing  in  energy  prices  in  1979.  Energy 
prices  began  to  subside  in  1981,  preceding  by  four  years  a  similar  change 
in  R&D.  One  could  construe  from  this  that  R&D  spending  did  respond 
to  the  energy  crisis,  but  only  with  a  significant  lag. 
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Statistical  EWence 
We  are  left  with  the  problem  of  determining  which  of  the  above  reasons 
is  primarily  responsible  for  the  R&D  boom  of  the  early  1980s.  If  it  was 
the  credit,  then  we  have  identified  an  effective  policy  tool  for  stimulats 
ing  industry  R&D.  If  it  was  military  procurement,  then  we  have  identi. 
fied  another  government  action  that  can  affect  private  R&D.  If  it  was 
foreign  competition  or  rising  energy  prices,  then  we  must  take  that  into 
account  in  our  national  R&D  policy.  The  investigation  of  this  question 
involved  three  different  types  of  statistical  studies  (described  below), 
each  designed  to  investigate  a  particular  aspect  of  the  R&D  boom. 
Iime  Series  Evidence 
How  much  did  the  R&E  tax  credit,  imports,  defense  spending,  and  energy 
prices  contribute  to  the  industry  R&D  boom?  One  way  to  estimate  these 
contributions  is  by  estimating  a  time  series  model  which  analyzes  the 
movement  of  industry  R&D  intensity  over  time.  This  type  of  study  was 
26  Public  Policy  hief . 
Emhating  tk  Sources  of  R&?/I  Spmfin~ 
conducted  using  data  from  1953  to  1992  and  is  described  in  full  detail  in 
the  appendix.  R&D  intensity  is  expected  to  be  a  function  of  the  R&E 
credit  (identified  by  the  years  the  credit  was  in  place),  import  intensity 
(U.S.  nonpetroleum  imports  divided  by  GDP),  defense  procurement 
(again  divided  by  GDP),  and  relative  energy  prices. 
The  results  show  that  the  complete  model  explains  approximately  95 
percent  of  the  variation  in  R&D  intensity.  For  the  entire  period,  only 
the  credit  and  imports  appeared  to  have  a  significantly  positive  effect  on 
industry  R&ID  as  a  share  of  GDP  During  the  more  recent  period  (1970 
to  1992)  both  of  these  variables  again  were  statistically  significant,  as 
were  defense  spending  and  energy  prices. 
It  is  instructive  to  look  at  the  estimated  effect  of  the  R&E  credit  on 
R&D  spending.  According  to  the  full  model,  the  ratio  of  industry  R&D 
to  GDP  was  0.12  percentage  points  higher  during  the  period  covered  by 
the  credit.  In  1980,  this  would  have  translated  into  a  10.5  percent 
increase  in  R&D  spending.14  This  is  a  large  gain,  assuming  the  effective 
credit  was  no  more  than  5  percent,  but  it  is  still  within  the  range  of 
earlier  studies.  These  preliminary  results  suggest  that  the  credit  may  have 
had  a  positive  effect  on  R&D  spending.  i 
:  ‘, 
Industry  Evidence 
One  of  the  major  drawbacks  of  a  simple  time  series  test  is  that  it  fails  to 
consider  variations  within  industries.  This  fault  is  particularly  important 
in  this  case  because  R&D  intensity  varies  so  widely  among  industries,  as 
do  DGD  procurements  and  imports.  The  top  five  R&D  spending  indus- 
tries  are  office,  computing,  and  accounting  machines;  motor  vehicles 
and  equipment  aircraft  and  missiles;  communication  equipment;  and 
drugs  (National  Science  Foundation  199Ob).  Together,  in  1989  these 
five  industries  accounted  for  52  percent  of  all  industry  R&D  but  only  19 
percent  of  sales  in  manufacturing.  DOD  procurement  is  even  more 
unevenly  distributed:  the  top  two  industries  (aircraft  and  missiles;  com- 
munication  equipment)  received  approximately  69  percent  of  all  orders 
in  1987  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  various  years  a). 
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largest  increases  in  R&D  spending  in  those  industries  with  the  largest 
increases  in  DOD  procurement  and  in  foreign  imports.  Regression  analy- 
sis,  described  in  more  detail  in  the  appendix,  shows  that  this  is,  in  fact, 
the  case.  The  test  was  based  on  a  sample  of  25  industries  covering  all  of 
manufacturing  from  1969  to  1989.  R&D  intensity,  defense  procurement, 
and  imports  are  all  divided  by  industry  shipments  rather  than  &DP,  but 
in  other  respects  this  test  is  similar  to  the  time  series  test.15  In  this  study, 
R&D  intensity  was  consistently  higher  in  those  industries  with  high 
ratios  of  imports  and  DOD  procurement  to  shipments.  There  was,  how- 
ever,  no  compelling  evidence  that  R&D  was  significantly  higher  during 
the  years  when  the  R&E  tax  credit  was  in  place.  For  all  industries,  the 
model  explained  99  percent  of  the  variation  in  R&D  intensity  over  this 
21  -year  period. 
Separate  tests  were  undertaken  to  investigate  the  role  of  these  variables 
in  specific  industries,  namely,  those  with  relatively  high  R&D  expendi- 
tures  (greater  than  1  percent  of  industry  shipments).  In  these  separate 
regressions,  imports  had  a  positive  significant  effect  in  six  industries 
(including  motor  vehicles);  DOD  procurement  had  a  positive  significant 
effect  in  five  industries  (including  aircraft  and  missiles);  and  the  R&E 
credit  had  a  positive  significant  effect  in  only  one  industry  (aircraft  and 
missiles).  But  even  the  latter  single  positive  result  is  questionable 
because  R&D  spending  in  the  aircraft  and  missiles  industry  is  heavily 
dependent  on  defense  orders. 
The  results  of  the  industry  analysis  appear  to  support  the  view  that  mili- 
tary  procurement  and  imports  are  largely  responsible  for  the  R&D  boom 
of  the  early  1980s.  Th  e  role  of  the  R&E  credit  remains  in  doubn  that  is, 
relative  to  the  other  factors  it  does  not  appear  that  the  credit  had  a  par- 
ticularly  significant  effect  on  industry  R&D  spending. 
Company  Evidence 
One  specific  concern  about  the  R&E  credit  is  that  the  beginning  of  the 
R&D  boom  actually  preceded  the  implementation  of  the  tax  credit  by 
approximately  three  years.  The  question  has  been  raised  as  to  whether 
the  increase  in  R&D  intensity  following  the  passage  of  the  credit  was,  in .  Evaluating  the  Sources  of  FX+‘D  Spending 
Figure  11  Expected  Effect  of  the  Research  and  Experimentation  Credit  on 
Industry  R&D 
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fact,  any  larger  than  the  increase  that  preceded  it  (Mansfield  1984).  In 
order  to  answer  this  question,  a  sample  of  221  firms  with  R&D  spending 
greater  than  $25  million  from  1978  to  1985  (the  duration  of  the  R&D 
boom)  was  collected  from  Standard  &  Poor’s  Compustat  database. 
One  of  the  advantages  of  company  data  that  has  been  exploited  by  other 
researchers  is  its  detailed  information  about  the  financial  positions  of 
firms  (for  example,  see  Hall  1993,  and  Swenson  1992).  In  these  data  sets 
it  is  possible  to  distinguish  between  firms  that  are  most  likely  to  benefit 
from  the  credit  and  those  that  are  not.  In  particular,  firms  with  histories 
of  net  losses  are  less  likely  to  be  able  to  use  the  credit  immediately,  espe- 
cially  if  they  have  no  current  or  past  tax  liability.  Here,  the  company 
data  set  was  used  to  test  whether  R&D  spending  grew  after  the  credit 
was  put  in  place  and,  more  specifically,  if  it  was  larger  for  those  firms 
with  the  most  to  gain  from  the  credit. 
The  results  of  this  exercise  are  described  in  the  appendix.  The  hypothe- 
sis  tested  was  thak’certain  factors  contributed  to  the  increase  in  R&D 
intensity  from  1978  to  1985,  an  intensity  that  accelerated  from  1981  to 
1985  under  the  R&E  credit.  The  nature  of  this  hypothesis  is  illustrated 
in  Figure  11.  The  growth  rate  in  R&D  intensity  is  represented  by  slope  a, 
which  increases  to  b  as  a  result  of  the  credit.16  The  analysis  in  the  appen- 
dix  provides  estimates  of  b  which;  to  the  extent  that  the  R&E  credit  was 
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effective,  would  be  expected  to  be  positive  and  statistically  significant. 
Estimates  of  b  using  the  entire  sample  are  positive  but  not  statistically 
significant.  It  does  not  appear,  at  least  for  this  sample,  that  R&D  spend- 
ing  significantly  accelerated  after  1980  due  to  the  R&E  credit. 
Additional  tests  were  conducted  to  exclude  those  firms  which,  due  to  a 
lack  of  tax  liability,  were  least  likely  to  qua&  for  the  credit.  In  one  test, 
firms  were  excluded  from  estimates  of  b  if  they  had  losses  in  the  current 
year.  In  another,  firms  were  excluded  if  their  accumulated  net  income  in 
the  current  and  previous  three  years  was  negative.  Each  of  these  tests 
allowed  for  the  fact  that  the  firms  most  likely  to  take  advantage  of  the 
credit  were  those  with  current  or  past  tax  liabihty.  In  every  one  of  these 
tests,  estimates  of  b  decreased  rather  than  increased.  Consequently,  the 
firms  that  had  the  greatest  potentia!  for  benefiting  from  the  R&E  credit 
did  not  appear  to  accelerate  significantly  their  R&E  spending  in  cornpar- 
ison  to  firms  with  less  potential  to  benefit  from  the  credit. 
Tentative  Conclusions 
The  results  of  this  research  and  others  suggest  several  tentative  con+ 
sions  (Mansfield  1986,  1984;  Eisner  1985,  1984).  While  part  of  the  per- 
iod  associated  with  the  R&D  boom  overlaps  the  RU  credit,  the  actual 
relationship  is  far  more  complicated.  It  would  be  difficult  to  conclude 
that  the  R&E  tax  credit  had  a  large  positive  effect  on  industry  R&D. 
The  R&D  boom  began  ,two  to  three  years  before  the:credit  was  passed 
and  ended  while  the  credit  was  still  in  place.  Alternatively,  this  analysis 
suggests  that  the  industry  R&D  boom  was  linked  to  a  rapid  expansion  in 
imports  and  defense  spending  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  to  energy  prices. 
Some  analysts  suggested  from  the  start  that  the  reason  the  R&E  credit 
was  not  likely  to  have  a  large  effect  yas  the  disincentives  built  into  the 
rolling  base.  The  effective  subsidy  for  any  increases  in  R&D  spending 
was  reduced  greatly  by  including  such  increases  in  the  calculation  of 
future  spending  thresholds.  What  begins  as  an  official  20  to  25  percent 
credit  may  shrink  to  an  effective  3  to  5  percent  credit  depending  on  the 
discount  rate  and  other  qualifications. 
If  the  credit  failed  to  have  a  more  prominent  effect  because  of  this  pen- 
alty,  why  didn’t  R&D  pick  up  after  the  penalty  was  eliminated  in  the 
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1989  reform?  Industry  R&D  has  remained  a  relatively  stable  1.3  percent  of 
GDP  since  1989,  slightly  below  its  1985  level.  In  most  economic  models, 
the  switch  to  a  fixed  ratio  in  the  calculation  of  the  credit  should  have 
magnified  greatly  the  incentive  to  invest.  One  possible  conclusion  is  that 
the  credit  is  not  especially  important  in  determining  R&D  spending. 
Another  possibility  is  that  the  added  incentive  of  eliminating  the  rolling 
base  was  exactly  offset  by  tightening  the  base  limitation.  Recall  that  the 
1989  tax  bill  limited  the  ml1  value  of  the  credit  to  expenditures  exceeding 
the  base  by  25  percent  or  less.  Beyond  25  percent  the  credit  was  reduced  by 
a  factor  of  four.  How  many  firms  this  might  have  affected  is  not  at  all  clear. 
Even  if  the  R&E  credit  did  stimulate  additional  R&D,  it  has  been  ques- 
tioned  whether  the  additional  spending  was  as  large  as  the  forgone  tax 
revenue.  Edwin  Mansfield  concluded  that  ‘The  extra  R&D  stimulated 
by  the  tax  credit  seems  to  have  been  considerably  less  than  the  revenue 
lost  to  the  Treasury”  (Mansfield  1984).  Table  I  provides  data  on  the 
value  of  allowed  R&E  credits  for  1981  through  199  1. 
Table  1 Research  and  Experimentation  Credit,  1981-1991 
Year  Allowable  R&E  Credit  (millions) 
1981  873 
1982  1,641 
1983  2,165 
I984  2,638 
1985  2,7N 
1986  1,309 
1987  1,053 
1988  1,276 
1989  1,391 
1990  1,547 
1991  1,656 
SOUTW:  Internal  Revenue  Service  (1986  and  unpublished  data). 
Mansfield  was  also  one  of  the  first  to  point  out  that  the  tax  credit  created 
an  incentive  for  firms  to  redefine  related  activities  as  research  and  experi- 
mentation  so  that  they  could  qualify  for  a  larger  credit.  He  concluded 
that  a  considerable  amount  of  the  initial  increases  in  R&E  spending  was 
caused  by  this  sleight  of  hand  rather  than  by  real  spending  increases. 
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This  report  began  by  identifying  a  large  and  growing  gap  between  non- 
defense  R&D  spending  in  the  United  States  and  similar  spending  in 
Japan  and  Germany.  If  the  United  States  is  to  look  forward  to  a  future 
that  includes  solid  shares  of  the  world’s  high-technology  markets,  it  must 
close  this  gap.  International  competition  will,  in  all  likelihood,  stimulate 
industry  R&D,  but  there  is  probably  little  hope  of  actually  closing  the 
gap  without  a  reorientation  of  U.S.  R&D  policy.  To  this  end  the  govern- 
ment  must  introduce  policies  that  either  stimulate  private  industry 
expenditures  or  expand  government  funded  R&D.  How  can  public  pol- 
icy  be  reoriented  to  address  these  challenges? 
While  private  industry  in  the  United  States  provides  46.9  percent  of 
total  R&D  funds,  the  comparable  shares  are  59.9  percent  in  Germany 
and  72.7  percent  in  Japan  (National  Science  Foundation  1993).  There 
obviously  is  room  for  U.S.  firms  to  increase  their  share  of  the  nation’s 
R&.D  effort.  But  other  than  the  R&E  credit,  there  are  few  public  policies 
that  are  even  intended  to  encourage  more  industry  R&D.  Given  the 
findings  of  this  report,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  a  stronger  credit 
would  do  much  good.  The  best  argument  one  could  make  in  its  favor, 
however,  is  that  the  credit  would  have  had  a  positive  effect  after  1989  if 
not  for  the  higher  base  limitation.  If  the  experiment  with  the  credit  is  to 
be  continued,  an  obvious  improvement  would  be  to  reverse  the  base  lim- 
itation  introduced  in  the  1989  tax  bill.  Instead  of  reducing  the  effective 
credit  for  R&D  spending  exceeding  25  percent  of  the  base,  the  credit 
could  be  increased.17 
For  such  a  change  to  make  a  difference,  it  must  be  demonstrated  that 
substantial  numbers  of  firms  would  be  less  likely  to  increase  annual  R&D 
spending  by  25  percent  or  more.  The  evidence  for  the  1978-1985  period 
suggests  that  this  is  true  for  many  firms.  In  fact,  approximately  40  per: 
cent  of  all  R&D  increases  during  this  time  originated  in  firms  with  indi- 
vidual  increases  of  25  percent  or  more.18  It  would  appear  that  a  signifi- 
cant  number  of  firms  could  benefit  from  the  removal  of  the  base  limita- 
tion  penalty. 
Before  pursuing  this  policy,  at  least  two  objections  must  be  overcome. 
First,  any  expansion  of  the  R&E  credit  is  likely  to  entail  lost  tax  rev- 
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enue,  a  problem  that  was  not  addressed  in  the  original  legislation  create 
ing  the  credit.  In  fact,  one  could  claim  that  the  R&E  credit  was  initially 
unfunded,  contributing  to  larger  federal  budget  deficits.19  In  today’s 
environment  it  is  more  difficult  to  justify  expanding  the  R&E  credit,  or 
even  keeping  it,  if  doing  so  would  mean  higher  deficit.  or  fewer  pur- 
chases  of  public  goods. 
This  raises  the  important  question  of  who  should  pay  for  the  credit. 
Recall  that  its  purpose  is  to  remedy  a  market  failure:  the  chronic  under- 
investment  in  R&D  due  to  uncertainty  and  lack  of  appropriability.  In 
theory,  firms  do  not  invest  suFtciently  in  R&D  because  much  of  the  hen 
efit  will  be  captured  by  other  firms.  To  the  extent  that  the  credit  causes 
some  firms  to  increase  their  R&D  funding,  others  will  benefit  without 
paying  a  cent.  Ideally,  one  would  want  those  corporations  benefiting  as 
free  riders  to  pay  the  cost  of  providing  the  incentive.  While  it  probably  is 
impossible  to  target  specific  free  riders  for  tax  purposes,  it  would  not  be 
inappropriate  to  finance  the  R&E  credit,  or  any  expansion  of  the  credit, 
with  a  slightly  higher  corporate  profit  tax. 
The  second  objection  to  strengthening  the  R&E  credit  is  more  funda- 
mental-it  may  not  work.  The  results  of  my  research  provide  few  reasons 
to  be  optimistic.  It  is  hard  to  imagine  that  any  change  in  the  credit 
would  spark  enough  industry  R&D  to  actually  close  the  gap. 
There  is  another  way  that  government  can  and  does  stimulate  industry 
R&D.  An  important  lesson  of  this  analysis  is  that  government  procure- 
ment  can  stimulate  private  expenditures.*’  Until  now  this  has  been 
proven  primarily  through  military  procurement,  which  accounted  for 
87.3  percent  of  all  manufacturing  sales  to  the  federal  government.  Other 
federal  agencies  are  relatively  small  consumers  of  industrial  goods.  In 
1987,  NASA  was  responsible  for  2.8  percent  of  all  federal  government 
orders  from  manufacturing;  the  Department  of  Energy’s  share  was  1.1 
percent;  and  all  other  federal  agencies  together  amounted  to  an  8.8  per- 
cent  share  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  1987).  Currently,  there  is  no 
other  federal  agency  that  compares  with  the  DOD  in  its  capacity  to  issue 
large  contracts  for  high-technology  products. 
As  defense  priorities  have  subsided,  there  has  been  a  growing  need  for 
public  goods  in  other  sectors,  such  as  transportation,  energy,  education, 
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environmental  protection,  and  health  care.  At  least  some  consideration 
should  be  given  to  expanding  the  procurement  capacity  of  other  agencies 
for  high-technology  projects.  It  is  conceivable  that  an  expansion  of  gov- 
ernment  procurement  awarded  on  the  basis  of  design  competition  would 
stimulate  considerable  private  R&D  in  each  of  these  nondefemse  .sectors. 
The  possibilities  in  these  areas  are  limited  by  funding,  not  by  a  lack  of 
good  ideas.  The  Department  of  Education  may  find  it  useful  to  purchase 
high  resokition  television  monitors  or  computers  for  schools,  the  National 
Institutes  of  Health  may  wish  to  purchase  equipment  for  medical  research, 
the  Department  of  Energy  may  attempt  to  develop  solar  cells  and  storage 
batteries  for  government  buildings,  or  the  Department  of  Transportation 
may  want  to  assist  in  the  development  of  modem  commuter  systems. 
These  purchases  would  not  only  contribute  to  improving  the  quality  of 
public  goods  but  could  replace  the  impetus  for  industrial  R&D  once  pro- 
vided  by  DOD.  These  technological  alternatives  should  be  given  serious 
consideration  as  replacements  for  canceled  weapons  systems. 
Even  wirh  an  increase  in  industry  R&D,  there  probably  is  little  hope  of 
closing  the  gap  without  an  increase  in  direct  government  expenditures 
on  nondefense  R&D.  One  part  of  this  reorientation  is  already  under  way 
as  military  research  is  converted  to  other  purposes.  Some  programs,  such 
as  the  Technology  Reinvestment  Project  (TRP),  provide  funds  for 
expanding  the  competitiveness  of  defense-dependent  industries  and  sup+ 
porting  “dual-use”  technologies  that  benefit  both  defense  and  nonde- 
fense  interests  (National  Science  Foundation  1993,  115).  There  are  also 
“cross-cutting”  R&D  initiatives  that  bring  several  federal  agencies 
together  to  coordinate  broad  areas  of  research  under  the  Federal 
Coordinating  Council  for  Science,  Engineering,  and  Technology 
(National  Science  Foundation  1993,  108). 
The  primary  problem  with  recent  conversion  efforts  is  that  they  have 
been  relatively  small.  Figure  12  shows  recent  trends  in  federal  contribu- 
tions  to  R&D  for  defense  and  nondefense  purposes.  Relative  to  GDP, 
R&D  for  defense  has  clearly  declined  since  1987,  but  there  has  been  no 
corresponding  increase  in  the  nondefense  share.  If  conversion  efforts  are 
to  contribute  to  the  national  R&D  effort)  federal  R&D  for  nondefense 
must  grow  much  faster. 
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A  second  problem  with  recent  conversion  efforts  is  that  several  new 
R&D  projects  have  been  retained  by  the  DOD  even  though  they  may 
have  little  to  do  with  defense.  While  the  department’s  spending  on  mili- 
tary  R&D  has  subsided  in  recent  years,  civilian  research  has  grown  rap- 
idly,  reaching  $1.9  billion  in  1993.  Many  of  these  projects,  which  focus 
on  health,  energy,  transportation,  or  manufacturing,  would  be  better 
placed  in  the  appropriate  federal  agencies,  such  as  the  National 
Institutes  of  Health  or  the  Energy,  Tmnsportation,  or  Commerce  depart- 
ments.  Included  in  this  list  is  $100  million  for  Sematech?  the  much  dis- 
cussed  research  joint  venture  between  private  businesses  and  the  DOD. 
This  was  only  one  of  35  different  projects  identified  by  the  G.A.9.  that 
range  from  medical  research  on  AIDS  and  breast  cancer,  $57  million  and 
$210  million  respectively,  to  the  national  aerospace  plane  technology 
program  at  $141  million  (U.S.  General  Accounting  Office  1993). 
Some  projects  undoubtedly  will  require  a  coordinated  effort  among  sev- 
eral  agencies,  requiring  a  “cross-cut”  initiative,  but  too  often  such  initia- 
tives  merely  serve  to  preserve  the  DOD’s  dominant  role.  An  advantage 
of  involving  more  government  agencies  in  this  process  would  be  to  foster 
competition  for  public  funds.  Each  agency  would  be  compelled  to 
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demonstrate  valuable  and  constructive  results  in  order  to  vie  with  other 
agencies  for  Congressional  funding, 
Conversion  will  require  more  than  simply  replacing  one  type  of  R&D 
with  another.  Important  issues  will  have  to  be  addressed:  where  federal 
R&D  efforts  will  be  directed,  how  they  will  be  administered,  and  which 
agencies  will  be  the  funding  sources.  Several  principles,  however,  should 
be  useful  in  guiding  the  expansion  of  nondefense  R&D.  Fiist,  Congress 
should  continue  to  determine  the  functional  distribution  of  research  funds. 
The  decision  of  how  much  money  to  place  in  health  research  versus  corn- 
puter  chip  technologies,  for  example,  must  be  based  on  open  public  discus- 
sion.  However,  Congress  should  not  be  involved  in  determining  the  spe- 
cific  allocation  of  research  money.  Recent  objections  to  such  determina- 
tions  have  focused  on  the  congressional  practice  of  earmarking  academic 
research  projects  for  particular  districts.  While  these  funds  remain  a  rela- 
tively  small  part  of  the  overall  federal  research  effort,  they  have  grown 
rapidly  in  recent  years.  Academic  R&D  funds  earmarked  by  Congress  rose 
from  $247  million  in  1990  to  $470  million  in  1991,  and  $707  million  in 
1992  (National  Science  Foundation  1993,  139).  It  is  difficult  to  defend 
the  merit  of  R&D  dollars  that  are  granted  through  any  process  other  than 
design  competitions  or  some  form  of  competitive  peer  review. 
Equally  difficult  to  defend  is  the  current  government  policy  of  reimburs- 
ing  firms  for  independent  R&D  conducted  primarily  by  defense  contrac- 
tors.  In  the  modern  era  it  makes  little  sense  for  the  government  to 
underwrite  R&D  in  which  it  plays  no  role  in  development  nor  enjoys 
any  control.  In  testimony  before  the  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee 
and  Joint  Economic  Committee  in  1975,  Admiral  H.G.  Rickover  con- 
cluded  that  “The  current  IR&D  [Independent  R&D]  program  does  not 
provide  benefits  to  the  Government  anywhere  near  the  cost”  (Rickover 
1975).  His  proposal  to  eliminate  the  practice  remains  equally  appropri- 
ate  today.  Independent  R&D  reimbursement,  which  costs  the  federal 
government  more  than  $2  billion  a  year,  should  be  discontinued 
(National  Science  Foundation  1993,360). 
Not  only  is  it  important  that  the  process  for  distributing  R&D  dollars  be 
defensible,  there  also  must  be  an  impartial  assessment  of  the  effective- 
ness  of  particular  lines  of  research.  It  is  much  easier  to  distribute  funds 
for  R&D  than  to  demonstrate  that  the  funds  are  well  spent.  For  this  pure 
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pme,  it  would  be  necessary  to  establish  a  review  process  that  would  do 
more  than  determine  whether  the  funds  were  spent  legally;  a  profes- 
sional  review  also  should  be  able  to  determine  whether  the  research  pro- 
duced  any  valuable  discoveries  or  innovations.  This  type  of  evaluation, 
which  is  occasionally  conducted  by  the  General  Accounting  Office, 
should  be  incorporated  as  an  integral  part  of  the  federal  R&D  effort. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  all  government  agencies  have  experi- 
mented  with  different  methods  for  funding  R&D.  In  some  cases,  grants 
are  issued  to  individual  academic  researchers  to  conduct  specific  experi- 
ments  or  research;  in  others,  the  government  has  embarked  on  joint 
efforts  with  private  businesses  and  required  specified  levels  of  spending  or 
performance  by  private  firms.  An  evaluation  of  one  of  these  joint  efforts, 
Sematech,  was  recently  reported  by  Irwin  and  Klenow  (1994).  In  this 
project,  the  government  allocated  approximately  $100  million  dollars  a 
year  to  support  research  by  a  consortium  of  U.S.  manufacturers  of  semi- 
conductors.  The  purpose  of  the  collaboration  was  to  improve  U.S.  semi- 
conductor  production  technology.  The  evidence  suggests  that  the  effort 
has  been  quite  successful.  While  other  industries  were  reducing  their 
R&D  spending  intensity  after  1987,  members  of  Sematech  increased  their 
spending  relative  to  sales  from  10.3  percent  to  11.6  percent.  In  addition, 
profits  increased  in  the  industry  and  U.S.  firms  regained  some  of  the  mar- 
ket  share  they  had  lost  during  the  previous  six  years. 
A  curious  outcome  of  this  joint  effort  was  that  R&D  intensity  by  U.S. 
manufacturing  firms  who  were  not  members  of  Sematech  increased  from 
7  percent  to  10.6  percent  of  sales.  Some  of  this  increase  may  have.  been 
related  to  the  formation  of  Sematech;  that  is,  nonmembers  may  have  felt 
compelled  to  increase  spending  on  R&D  so  as  not  to  fall  behind 
Sematech  members.  Given  the  choice  between  contributing  to 
Sematech  or  increasing  their  own  R&D  budgets  and  hoping  for  spin-offs 
from  Sematech,  nonmembers  may  have  found  the  latter  to  be  less  costly. 
This  raises  the  possibility  that  Sematech  not  only  contributed  to  an 
increase  in  R&D  intensity  among  its  members  but  also  inspired  a  signifi- 
cant  increase  in  R&D  spending  by  nonmembers. 
Irwin  and  Klenow  (1994)  present  a  considerably  different  view  of  these 
facts.  They  assumed  that  Sematech  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  increase 
in  R&D  spending  by  nonmembers  and  attributed  the  industry’s  good  for- 
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dollar,  a  semiconductor  trade  agreement  with  Japan  that  blunted  foreign 
competition,  and  the  declining  importance  of  memory  chips  compared 
with  microprocessors  in  the  semiconductor  market.”  But  rather  than  test 
these  hypotheses,  Irwin  and  Klenow  simply  accept  them  as  fact.  The 
depreciation  of  the  dollar  may  have  helped  U.S.  semiconductor  manu- 
facturers,  but  it  aho  would  have  helped  a  whole  range  of  U.S.  firms  that 
did  not  raise  R&D  spending  to  any  comparable  degree.  If  the  trade 
agreement  with  Japan  was  the  cause  for  the  turnaround,  then  it  was 
more  effective  than  most  observers  would  have  expected.  And  if  the  rea- 
son  was  due  to  a  shift  in  demand  favoring  U.S.  technology  at  that  time, 
at  least  in  this  instance  the  government  bet  on  a  winner.  The  question 
remains  whether  the  industry  recovered  because  of  Sematech  or  because 
of  exchange  rates,  trade  agreements,  or  demand  shifts.  One  hopes  future 
research  on  Sematech  will  address  this  question. 
Whether  joint  efforts  are  effective  or  not  remains  to  be  seen.  Up  to  this 
point,  no  particular  method  has  proven  superior  to  any  other  in  produc- 
ing  socially  useful  innovations.  It  is  conceivable  that  a  better  system  of 
assessing  the  results  of  federally  funded  research  would  shed  more  light 
on  the  effectiveness  of  these  various  funding  alternatives. 
Appendix.  Accounting  for  the  Industry 
R&DBoom:  1978-1985 
Why  did  industry  R&D  increase  so  rapidly  from  1978  to  1985,  and  how 
much  did  the  R&E  tax  credit  have  to  do  with  it?  These  questions  are 
addressed  in  this  appendix,  utilizing  a  number  of  different  statistical  tests. 
Time  Series 
The  first  approach  is  a  time  series  analysis  that  attempts  to  model 
changes  in  industry  R&D  as  a  share  of  GDP  from  1953  to  1992.  It  is 
expected  that  this  variable  is  determined  by  the  level  of  international 
competition,  the  level  of  defense  procurement,  energy  prices,  and  the 
R&E  credit.  International  competition  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  U.S. 
nonpetroleum  imports  to  GDP  (Econom&  Qwrt  of  he  President  1994). 
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Dependent  variable:  Industry  R&D/GDP 
1953-1992  19’70-1992 
1  2  3  4 
.062  .066*  .32**  .12** 
WI81  i.053)  LO31  W4) 




Defense/shipments  -1.72  10.77** 
(2.55)  (2.89) 
Energy  prices  .18  .141* 
(.I51  (.081) 
Constant  .99**  .59**  102** 
i.13)  t.151  (02) 
.46** 
(.lOJ 
Adjusted  R2  .95  .95  .90  .9.5 
Nores:  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  All  estimates  are  multiplied  hy  100. 
*  Sipificantly  different  fbm  zero  at  the  5  percent  level. 
**  Significantly  different  from zero at  the  1 percent  level. 
Sowces:  Author’s  calculations  based on  data  in Economic  Repmc  of  the  President  (  1994);  U.S. 
Department  of  the  Tma.wy  (various  years);  National  Science  Foundation  (1993,333). 
The  annual  level  of  procurement  for  the  DOD  was  also  divided  by  GDP 
to  represent  changes  in  intensity  over  time  (U.S.  Department  of  the 
Treasury,  various  years).  Energy  prices  were  equal  to  the  ratio  of  the  pro- 
ducer  price  index  for  fuels,  related  products,  and  power  to  total  producer 
price  index  (Economic  Report  of  tkre  Preskfent  1994).  The  variable  for  the 
R&E  credit  was  equal  to  one  in  the  years  that  the  credit  applied  (1981 
and  thereafter)  and  0  in  the  years  before  1981.  Finally,  industry  R&D 
was  equal  to  the  annual  funds  provided  by  industry  for  R&D,  again 
divided  by  GDP  (National  Science  Foundation  1993,  333;  U.S. 
Department  of  the  Treasury,  various  years). 
The  results  of  ordinary  least  squares  regressions  for  the  entire  period- 
1953  to  1992-are  reported  in  Table  Al.  Because  of  the  presence  of 
strong  serial  correlation,  each  of  the  estimates  includes  corrections  for 
autocorrelation  using  the  Cochrane-Orcutt  method.  In  the  first  regres- 
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the  second  regression  (column  2)  both  the  credit  and  import  variables 
were  statistically  significant,  the  former  at  the  5  percent  level  and  the 
latter  at  the  1  percent  level.  Coefficients  on  the  defense  and  energy 
prices  variables  were  not  statistically  significant. 
The  results  were  different,  however,  when  the  time  frame  was  limited  to 
the  more  recent  1970  to  1992  period.  The  credit  variable  was  highly  sig- 
nificant  whether  it  was  included  alone  (column  3)  or  with  additional 
explanatory  variables  (column  4).  The  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  also 
increased  in  the  full  model,  indicating  that  the  industry  R&D-to-GDP 
ratio  was  0.12  percentage  points  higher  during  the  period  of  the  credit. 
In  this  specification,  import  intensity  and  defense  orders  are  also  highly 
significant,  both  at  the  1  percent  level.  The  implication  is  that  higher 
imports  or  defense  purchases  tend  to  increase  the  level  of  industry  R&D. 
Energy  prices  are  also  significant  in  this  model,  at  the  5  percent  level, 
suggesting  higher  R&D  during  the  energy  crisis. 
Why  was  defense  spending  highly  significant  in  the  recent  period  but 
not  in  the  longer  period  dating  back  to  1953?  Going  back  to  the  earlier 
period,  defense  procurement  experienced  a  major  reduction  following 
World  War  II  and  the  Korean  War.  Much  of  this  reduction  was  related  to 
the  demobihzation  of  a  very  large  standing  army,  one  that  was  gradually 
replaced  by  more  sophisticated  weapons  systems  including  nuclear  mis- 
siles.  The  initial  decline  in  DOD  procurement  probably  coincided  with 
an  increase  in  high-technology  procurement  and  would  not  have  had  a 
depressing  effect  on  industry  R&D.  0-1  the  other  hand,  much  of  the  mil- 
itary  buildup  in  the  1980s  was  focused  specifically  on  high  technology 
areas  including  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative.  Within  this  context  it  is 
not  surprising  that  an  expansion  of  DOD  procurement  could  stimulate 
industry  R&D  in  the  1980s  while  a  decrease  in  procurement  in  the 
1950s  and  1960s  would  have  no  equivalent  impact. 
The  resuhs  of  this  test  suggest  that  the  credit  did  have  a  significant  posi- 
tive  effect  on  industry  R&D  spending.  There  are,  however,  grounds  to  be 
skeptical.  The  problem  is  that  several  of  the  explanatory  variables  are 
highly  correlated,  even  in  the  period  from  1970  to  1992.  The  correlation 
between  defense  spending,  energy  prices,  and  R&D  spending  is  high,  but 
it  is  especially  high  between  imports  and  R&D  spending  with  a  correla- 
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the  R&E  credit  makes  it  particularly  difficult  to  determine  the  indepen- 
dent  contribution  of  each  variable. 
Industry  Study 
Another  approach  to  this  question  is  to  study  changes  in  R&D  spending 
in  specific  industries.  For  this  purpose,  data  were  collected  for  25  indus- 
tries  for  the  1969  to  1989  period.  Industry  categories  were  based  on  those 
of  the  National  Science  Foundation  as  contained  in  their  reports  on 
industry  R&D  spending.  Although  these  industries  cover  all  of  manufac- 
turing,  they  represent  an  amalgam  of  two-  and  three-digit  industries 
based  on  the  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  coding  system. 
The  credit  variable  was  identical  to  the  one  used  in  the  time  series 
study.  ”  The  ratio  of  R&D  to  ship  ments  was  measured  by  the  ratio  of 
company  funds  spent  on  industrial  R&D  to  industry  shipments 
(National  Science  Foundation,  199Ob,  1981).**  The  imports-to-ship- 
ments  variable  was  measured  by  the  ratio  of  imports  from  consumption 
to  industry  shipments  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  various  years 
b,c).23  The  defense-to-shipments  ratio  was  measured  by  industry  ship- 
ments  to  the  DOD  divided  by  total  industry  shipments  (U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce,  various  years  a,b).24  Shipments  were  total 
industry  shipments  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  various  years  a,d). 
Other  data,  for  defense  spending  and  imports,  were  aggregated  from  the 
three-digit  level  to  the  National  Science  Foundation  (NSF)  industry 
code.  Significant  revisions  were  made  to  the  SIC  in  1987,  requiring 
some  adjustment  for  later  years.  Fortunately,  the  Census  of  M~~~~Lcrures 
reported  DOD  shipments  from  manufacturing  in  1987  according  to  both 
the  new  and  old  classification  system,  making  it  possible  to  adjust  post- 
1986  data.  Furthermore,  the  Department  of  Commerce  did  not  report 
DOD  shipments  for  specific  industries  after  1987  or  for  the  years  1985 
and  1986.  The  defense  data  for  these  years  were  estimated  by  interpola- 
tion  using  known  estimates  of  total  DOD  procurement  (U.S. 
Department  of  the  Treasury  1992,542)  in  each  year.  R&D  data  were  also 
missing  for  some  industries,  especially  during  the  earlier  years  of  the 
period.  These  were  also  estimated  by  means  of  interpolation.25 
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Independent 
Variable 
Dependent  Variable:  R&D/Shipments 
1  2  3  4 
, 
Credit  .0009  .OOll  .0006  .0012 
l.0008)  (.0008)  (.OOOS)  (.0008) 
Imports/shipments  .016**  .016** 
(.005)  (.005) 
Defense/shipments  .039**  .039** 
WO9)  0709) 
Industry  variables  x  X  X  X 
Adjusted  R*  .99  .99  .99  .99 
Norex  Srandard  errors  are  in  parenthws. 
*  Significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5  percent  level. 
**  Significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1 percent  level. 
Sources:  Authors  calculations  based  on  data  in  National  Science  Foundation  (199Ob, 
1981);  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  (various  years  a,  b,  c,  d). 
Estimates  of  this  model  for  all  25  industries  for  the  1969  to  1989  period 
are  presented  in  Table  A2.  The  estimates  are  from  ordinary  least  squares, 
corrected  for  autocorrelation.  The  full  model  is  presented  in  column  1. 
Results  show  that  both  imports  and  defense  .spending  appeared  to  have 
had  a  positive  effect  on  industry  R&D  spending  and  were  highly  signifi- 
cant  (at  the  1  percent  level).  The  credit  variable  was  positive  but  not 
statistically  significant.  In  other  regressions,  in  which  various  variables 
are  omitted,  the  credit  coefficient  remained  largely  unchanged  and 
insignificant.  According  to  this  test,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  credit 
had  a  strong  effect  on  industry  R&D  spending. 
An  alternative  to  testing  the  effect  of  these  variables  for  all  industries  is 
to  test  them  individually  for  each  industry.  Such  tests  were  conducted  for 
each  industry  that  had  a  ratio  of  R&D  to  shipments  greater  than  or 
equal  to  1  percent.  The  results,  reported  in  Table  A3,  indicate  that 
imports  were  apparently  important  in  some  industries  while  defense  pro- 
curement  was  important  in  others.  In  only  one  industry,  aircraft  and  mis- 
siles,  did  the  credit  appear  to  have  a  positive  and  significant  effect.  The 
results  for  this  industry  are  obviously  going  to  be  influenced  hy  the  fact I  Evaluating  the Sources  of RiYD  Sfznding 
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Table  A3  Regressions  on  R&D  Intensity,  Descriptive  Results  for  Specific 
Industries,  1969-1989 
Standard 
Mean  Industrial 
R&D/shipments  Classification 
Industries  for  which  imports 
had  a  significant  positive  effect  on  R&D  intensity 
Drugs  and  other  medicines  .094  283 
Other  chemicals  .015  284,Zi35,287-89 
Office,  computing,  and  accounting  machines  .132  357 
Electronic  components  .044  367 
Motor  vehicles  and  equipment  .031  371 
Cptical,  surgical,  photographic,  and 
ocher  instruments  .059 
Industries  for  which  defense  spendiig 
had  a  significant  positive  effect  on  R&D  intensity 
Rubber  producrs  .OlO  300 
Other  machinery,  except  electrical  .013  351-54,35&359 
Electrical  components  .044  367 
Aircrafr  and  missiles  .052  372,376 
Scientific  and  mechanical  measuring  equipment  .051  381,382 
Industries  for  which  the  R&E  tax  credit 
had  a  significant  positive  effect  on  R&D  intensity 
Aircraft  and  missiles  .052 
Other  industries  with  high  R&D  intensity 
(R&D/shipments  greater  than  .Ol) 
Industrial  chemicals  .029  281-82,286 
Petroleum  refining  .012  2YO 
Srone,  clay,  and  glass  products  .OlO  320 
Radio  and  tv  receiving  cquipmcnt  .018  .365 
Communication  equipment  .079  366 
Other  electrical  equipment  .021  361-64,369 
3t33.87 
372,376 
Sowces:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  data  in  National  Science  Foundation  (l99Oh, 
1981);  US.  Department  of Commerce  (various  years a,b,c,dJ. 
that  it  is  the  largest  defense  manufacturer.  In  1987,  this  single  industry 
accounted  for  44  percent  of  all  shipments  to  the  federal  government. 
The  possibility  of  distinguishing  between  the  effect  from  the  credit  and 
the  effect  of  defense  procurement  is  probably  least  likely  for  this  industry. 
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Company  Study 
Another  question  that  can  be  addressed  using  statistical  analysis  is 
whether  the  R&D  boom  accelerated  after  1980  when  the  R&E  credit 
was  introduced.  This  question  can  be  explored  using  company  data 
obtained  from  Standard  6~  Poor’s  Compustat  database.  With  these  data, 
it  is  possible  to  identify  particular  companies  that  were  most  likely  to 
have  benefited  from  the  R&E  credit.  Specifically,  firms  that  had  current 
positive  net  income  or  positive  net  income  over  the  past  three  years 
were  likely  to  have  benefited  the  most  from  the  R&E  credit. 
Unfortunately,  data  that  describe  the  level  of  import  competition  or  the 
magnitude  of  defense  procurement  are  typically  lacking  at  the  company 
level,  making  it  difficult  to  test  a  complete  model  of  R&D  behavior. 
In  order  to  test  the  possibility  that  the  credit  caused  the  R&D  boom  to 
accelerate,  a  model  was  estimated  using  a  spline  function.  In  this  .specifi- 
cation  the  credit  variable  essentially  measured  the  change  in  R&D 
growth  after  1980.26  The  spline  function  is  appropriate  in  this  instance 
because  the  question  is  whether  R&D  investment  accelerated  after  1980, 
and  the  theory  clexly  identifies  the  introduction  of  the  R&E  tax  credit 
in  1981  as  the  pivot  point.  The  model  was  tested  for  a  sample  of  221  firms 
with  annual  R&D  spending  of  $25  million  or  more  from  1978  to  1985. 
The  results  of  this  regression,  again  corrected  for  autocorrelation  and 
including  company  dummy  variable,  are  presented  in  Table  A4.  Results 
in  the  first  column  simply  confirm  that  R&D  intensity  increased  signifi- 
cantly  during  the  period.  The  positive  coefficient  (.091)  on  the  credit 
variable  in  the  second  column  show  that  R&D  spending  accelerated  after 
1980  but  that  the  magnitude  of  the  acceleration  was  not  significant  at  the 
5  percent  level.  The  third  and  fourth  regressions  experimented  with  dif- 
ferent  specifications  for  the  credit  variable.  The  results  in  column  3  are 
for  a  specification  in  which  the  acceleration  was  tested  only  for  firms  with 
current  positive  net  income.  The  results  in  column  4  represent  a  specifi- 
cation  in  which  the  effect  of  the  credit  was  limited  to  firms  with  positive 
net  income  over  the  past  three  years.  ”  By  imposing  the  latter  two  condi- 
tions  on  the  credit  variable,  the  effect  of  the  credit  was  measured  only  for 
those  firms  with  the  strongest  potential  for  benefiting  from  it.  The  result 
was  rather  surprising  since  the  coefficients  on  the  revised  credit  variables 
were  negative  and  even  statistically  significant.  One  interpretation  is 
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Table A4  Regressions  on  R&D  Intensity  According  to  Gmpany  Data, 
197&3-1985 
Dependent  Variable:  Company  R&D/Sales 
independent 
Variable  1  2  3  4 
.190**  .119**  .296**  .196** 







Company  Dummy  Var.  x  X  X  X 
Adjusted  R2  .94  .94  .94  .94 
Notes:  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  All  estimates  ate  multiplied  hy  100. 
*  Si~mifican~ly  different  from  zero  at  the  5  percent  level. 
**  Simificantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1 percent  level. 
Source:  Author’s  ckulations  based  on  data  fmm  Standard  &  Poor’s C0Ml’USTAT  database. 
that  firms  with  negative  net  income  aim  experienced  declining  sales.  If 
these  firms  did  not  reduce  their  R&D  spending  proportionately  with 
sales,  their  R&D  intensity  would  have  increased.  Once  these  firms  are 
accounted  for,  R&D  showed  no  sign  of  accelerating  under  the  credit. 
Tests  also  were  conducted  that  combined  industry  variables  with  com- 
pany  observations.  Industry  data  were  linked  to  the  company’s  primary 
industry,  a  specification  that  is  not  always  appropriate,  especially  for 
large,  diversified  companies.  It  was  not  clear  whether  the  insignificance 
of  the  industry  variables  in  this  format  captured  a  real  effect  or  merely 
was  the  result  of  a  poor  match  between  industry  and  company  data. 
These  results  indicate  that  any  acceleration  in  R&D  spending  after  1980 
was  most  likely  to  occur  among  those  firms  with  the  least  potential  for 
benefiting  from  the  credit,  namely,  those  with  negative  net  income. 
There  is  little  support  here  for  believing  that  the  R&E  credit  made  much 
of  a  contribution  to  the  R&D  boom  from  1978  to  1985. 
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Notes 
1.  All  references  to  Germany  refer  only  to  West  Germany. 
2.  Japan’s  expenditures  were  less  than  0.1  percent  of  GDP  but  appear  to  be 
zero  in  the  figure  due  to  rounding  error. 
3.  Individual  businesses  spend  some  of  their  own  funds  on  defense,  often  with 
the  intention  of  winning  government  contracts.  Some  portion  of  these 
expenditures  is  currently  reimbursed  by  the  Department  of  Defense  but 
may  not  be  designated  as  government  R&D  funds. 
4.  Annual  growth  in  a  country’s  R&D  spending  (Gf&  depends  on  gtowth 
in  its  share  of  nondefense  R&D  spending  out  of  GDP  (Gs)  and  on  its 
growth  in  tiDl’  (Gr).  Specifically, 
These  growth  rates  were  then  used  to  calculate  changes  in  the  ratios  of 
nondefense  spending  by  the  United  States  and  Japan  and  Germany.  GDP 
figures  were  obtained  from  International  Monetary  Fund  (1994). 
5.  High  technology  industries  include  aircraft,  computer  and  office  equip- 
ment,  pharmaceuticals,  communication  equipment,  electrical  machinery, 
and  instruments  (National  Science  Foundation  1993,440). 
6.  In  effect  the  base  was  equal  to 
and 
%RE.,  for  1981 
(with  the  last  component  applying  to  only  half  the  year).  REi  =  research 
and  experimentation  expenditures  -in  year  i. 
7.  The  effective  credit  rate  (k)  depends  on  the  stated  credit  rate  (K)  and  the 
discount  rate  according  to  the  following  formula: 
8.  The  fixed  ratio  is  equal  to  the  firm’s  historical  ratio  of  R&D  expenditures 
to  sales  from  1984  to  1988.  The  base  is  then  calculated  as  the  product  of 
this  ratio  and  average  receipts  over  the  four  preceding  years.  The  ratio  was 
set  at  3  percent  for  start-up  companies,  and  special  provisions  were  made  to 
develop  a  fiied  ratio  for  these  firms  and  for  those  without  sufficient  records 
of  R&E  expenses  or  receipts  in  the  1980s. 
9.  For  example,  assuming  a  discount  rate  of  10  percent,  the  effective  credit  on 
an  additional  dollar  of  R&D  spending  increases  from  3.4  percent  to  20  per- 
cent.  This  is  approximately  a  sixefold  increase  in  the  effective  credit. 
10.  Where  the  base  was  required  to  be  at  least  SO  percent  of  current  qualified 
R&E  expenditures  up  to  1990,  the  minimum  was  gradually  raised  to  75 
percent  by  1995  (Senate  Committee  on  Finance  1989). 
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11.  This  is  based  on  a  0.29  percentage  point  change  in  the  R&D  share  of  GDP 
from  1980  to  1985.  This  ratio,  multiplied  by  1980  GDP  ($2,708  bilhon) 
and  divided  by  total  industry  R&D  spending  in  1980  ($30.9  billion),  yields 
an  increase  of  25.8  percent.  If  the  effective  credit  is  assumed  to  have  been 
approximately  5  percent,  the  implied  long*run  elasticity  with  respect  to  R&D 
prices  is  5.2,  far  greater  than  the  range  of  2.0  to  2.7  estimated  by  Hall  (1993). 
12.  If  rising  DOD  procurement  in  the  early  1980s  stimulated  private  R&D,  why 
didn’t  falling  DOD  procurement  during  the  1950s  and  1960s  cause  the 
reverse  to  occur?  During  this  time,  the  United  States  was  simultaneously 
demobilizing  from  the  Korean  War  and  World  War  II  and  mobilizing  for  the 
cold  war.  It  is  quite  possible  that,  although  DOD  ptocurement  was  being  cut 
at  this  time,  a  greater  emphasis  was  being  placed  on  sophisticated  weapons 
systems  produced  by  private  indusny.  Some  of  the  early  reduction  in  pro- 
curement  was  related  to  the  shift  from  personnel  to  weapons  systems.  There 
were,  in  fact,  nearly  one  million  fewer  military  employees  in  1975  than  in 
1955  (U.S.  Department  ofTreasury  1979,353). 
13.  Energy  prices  are  represented  by  the  ratio  of  the  producer  price  index  for 
fuels,  power,  and  related  products  to  the  overall  producer  price  index. 
14.  Multiplying  .0012  by  1980  GDP  ($2,708  billion)  and  dividing  this  by 
industry  R&D  spending  in  1980  ($30.9  billion)  yields  10.5  percent. 
Assuming  a  5  percent  effective  credit,  the  elasticity  estimated  in  this  test  is 
2.1,  which  falls  within  Hall’s  estimated  range  of  2.0  to  2.7  (Hall  1993). 
15.  The  energy  price  variable  was  omitted  because  it  was  not  particularly  impor- 
tant  in  the  time  series  data  and  because  there  was  no  cross-sectional  dimen- 
sion  to  it. 
16.  The  model  is  a  sphne  function  of  the  form: 
R&D/Sales  =  a0  +  aYr  +  b(Yr  -  YJCr  +  e. 
In  this  model,  R&D  intensity  is  a  function  of  time  (YJ.  The  variable  Cr  is 
equal  to  one  when  the  credit  was  in  force  (1981  and  on),  and  Yc  is  equal  to 
1980.  R&D  intensity  increases  at  the  rate  of  a  per  year  until  1981,  when  it 
accelerates  (or  decelerates)  by  an  amount  proportional  to  b. 
17.  A  very  similar  problem  existed  with  the  old  utility  price  structure  called 
declining  Hock  rates.  With  lower  prices  at  higher  levels  of  consumption,  this 
policy  encouraged  consumption  rather  than  conservation.  Modem  price 
structures  are  more  likely  to  contain  &reusing  block  rates,  which  encourage 
conservation. 
18.  This  is  based  on  a  sample  averaging  525  firms  from  1978  to  1985.  In  this 
sample,  60  percent  of  all  increases  in  R&D  were  from  firms  with  0  to  25 
percent  R&D  growth  rates,  37  percent  from  firms  with  25  to  100  percent 
growth  races,  and  3  percent  from  firms  with  more  than  100  percent  growth 
races.  (Source:  Smndard  &  Poor’s  Compuscat  database). 
19.  The  discussion  here  treats  the  tax  credit  as  a  microeconomic  policy  intended 
to  correct  a  case  of  market  failure.  If  the  purpose  is  to  stimulate  the  macro- 
economy  through  deficit  spending,  then  the  issue  of  funding  is  irrelevant. Closing  he  R@D  Gap  , 
20.  As  Lichtenberg  (1988)  has  demonstrated,  government  procurement  stimu- 
lates  private  F&D  spending  primarily  through  design  and  technical  compes 
titions  in  which  firms  compete  with  each  other  for  the  purpose  of  winning 
production  contracts.  His  results,  K&K&r,  tipply  only  to  competitive  con- 
tracts.  Noncompetitive  contracts,  often  issued  as  a  follow-on  to  existing 
contracts,  actually  had  the  opposite  effect-reducing  industry  R&D.  Since 
competitive  procurement  had  a  relatively  stronger  impact,  the  overall  effect 
of  government  prmurement  on  R&D  remained  positive. 
21.  The  credit  variable  had  mean  and  standad  deviation  of  0.429  and  0.034 
respectively. 
22.  The  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  the  R&D-to-shipments  ratio  were 
0.028  and  0.034  respectively. 
23.  The  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  the  imports-to-shipments  ratio  were 
0.112  and  0.151  respectively. 
24.  The  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  the  defense-to-shipments  ratio  were 
0.059  and  0.130  respectively, 
25.  In  this  case,  interpolation  was  based  on  the  industry’s  share  ofR&D  spending. 
26.  This  is  based  on  a  spline  function,  de.xribed  in  footnote  16. 
27.  In  column  4,  for  example,  the  credit  variable  is  equal  to  one  only  if  the 
year  is  1981  or  later  and  the  sum  of  current  net  profits  and  net  profits  of 
the  previous  three  years  is  greater  than  zero. 
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